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Abstract
Large manufacturers usually need to manage multiple projects in order to leverage their
financial and engineering resource investments on new technologies and designs. The purpose of
this paper is to explore the relationship between different multi-project strategies and project
performances measured by lead time and engineering hours. The multi-project strategy in this
study focuses on different ways of transferring core technologies and designs from one project to
another within the firm. First, this paper proposes a typology of different multi-project strategies,
which categorizes new product development projects into four types: new design, rapid design
transfer, sequential design transfer, and design modification. Second, using our survey results on
103 different new product projects at 10 automobile firms in Japan and the U.S., this study
concludes that projects using the rapid design transfer strategy are the most efficient in terms of
engineering hours. Only through rapid design transfer can a preceding design be transferred from
a base project to a new project with effective task sharing among engineers and mutual adjustments
between the two projects. This paper also discusses organizational requirements for managing
rapid design transfer projects. Neither a pure project-team approach nor a functional approach
seem appropriate for the management of concurrent multiple projects.
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1 Introduction
In many industries, large manufacturers have at least several product lines and constantly
undertake multiple development projects to add new product lines or to improve and replace
existing products. In order to achieve economies of scale and scope, firms may want to leverage
their financial and engineering resource investments on new technologies and designs. These firms
need to systematically manage these multiple projects in addition to individual projects.
Specifically, technologies and designs developed in one project are often reused or transferred to
other projects within the firm. Therefore, each new product development project often has both
technological and organizational linkages or interdependencies with other past or on-going
projects. The strategic management of these linkages among multiple projects is complicated but is
often a critical issue for a firm's product-development performance. However, there has been little
empirical research that systematically explores the complicated inter-project technology transfers
within a firm and their impact on project performance. The purpose of this study is to explore
product-development strategy with respect to core-design transfers among multiple projects and
their impact on project performance including lead time and productivity.
Since the management of new product development has become a central issue in global
competition, a number of studies have focused on the speed and the productivity of individual
projects (Cohen, et al. 1979; Quinn and Mueller 1982; Imai et al., 1985; Gold, 1987; Gomory 1989;
Gupta and Wilemon, 1990; Womack et al., 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Cusumano, 1991;
Cordero, 1991; McDonough III and Barczak, 1991; von Braun, 1991; Leonald-Barton and Sinha
1991; Crawford, 1992). One common finding across these studies is that, in order to shorten the
development lead time and to achieve high productivity, a relatively project-oriented organization
with strong cross-functional coordination is essential. Each project in this approach is relatively
independent of other projects within the firm, and strong project managers facilitate quick
completion of a project by integrating different functions within the project (Clark and Fujimoto,
1991). But even though this approach has led to successful individual projects, it may not
necessarily be efficient for managing linkages among multiple projects.
High levels of engineering productivity in individual projects alone may or may not
contribute to making a firm more effective in product development. But different ways to manage
multiple new product development projects such as by taking repeated advantage of designs and
components in more than one product may boost the effectiveness and the efficiency of the entire
firm. Rapid transfers of technologies and designs from one project to others may thus increase the
speed of completing multiple projects and may decrease component costs for individual projects
through inter-project synergies. In short, the project-team approach alone has not provided
insights into the management of the entire project portfolio within the firm. Because of
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Iincreasingly intense international competition, the perspective of multi-project management has
become a critical issue for competition (Fujimoto et al., 1992; Meyer and Utterback, 1993).
The strategic management of specific inter-project linkages must account for more
dimensions than the simple distinction between radical innovation (i.e., a technology new to the
firm) and incremental change (i.e., the migration of technology existing within the firm), discussed
in a relatively large number of past studies (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Ettlie, et al., 1984). Some
academic researchers have emphasized the strategic importance of planning for and managing the
evolution of a sequence of new product projects (Hayes, et al., 1988; Wheelwright and Sasser, 1989;
Meyer and Utterback, 1993). Wheelwright and Sasser (1989) have discussed the importance of the
effective strategic management of a core product with a distinctive platform and its derivative
projects. (Similar discussions are also seen in Hayes, et al., 1988 and Wheelwright and Clark,
1992). They have discussed this strategic issue by suggesting a framework known as the product
generation map. Meyer and Utterback (1993) have also discussed the management of product
families. They emphasized the importance of planning and managing the evolution of a portfolio of
products, focusing on the development and application of a firm's core technology. The concepts of
managing the product generation map and the product family are related to the multi-project
strategy discussed in this study. However, these researchers have not yet empirically examined the
relationship between different strategies explained by these frameworks and project performance.
In the next section, we proposes a typology of different types of multi-project strategies.
Section 3 hypothesizes the relationship between these strategies and project performance measured
by lead time and engineering hours. After we discuss the sample and measurements for the
questionnaire survey in Section 4, Section 5 provides an evidence that one type of multi-project
strategy has a significant advantage in engineering hours. Section 6 discusses strategic and
organizational implications from the survey results.
2 A Framework: A Typology of Multi-Project Strategy
A framework for multi-project strategy in this study considers two different types of
linkages between multiple projects: the linkages between different product lines (inter-product-
line linkage) and the linkages between past and present projects (evolutional linkage). For
example, some projects may use the core technology of a previous generation of the same product
line, and others may transfer and use the core technology from other product lines within the firm.
This study refers to both cases as design transfers between multiple projects. On the other hand,
some other projects may choose to develop a new technology from scratch without using either type
of design transfer.
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Covering these aspects of design transfers, Figure 1 proposes a multi-project strategy
typology. This typology categorizes new product development projects into four types, depending
on the extent of changes, sources of the base design, and the timing of design transfer. This
typology covers all types of new product development projects, and these four types are mutually
exclusive.
For the analysis in this paper, we focus on the design transfer of the vehicle platform as a
core design in new car development projects. However, the same framework can be applied to major
components of most system products. A platform primarily consists of floor panels, a suspension
system, a firewall and rocker panels. It defines the architecture of the automobile because the
platform significantly affects the basic characteristics of the rest of the vehicle's components
including the body structure, drive-train type and engine/transmission size. Platform design, from
this perspective, is considered to be a "core" sub-system. This notion of the platform as the core
sub-system of the automobile is widely shared by people in the industry, as well as by researchers
studying the industry. The selection of a specific platform design determines the general level of
design functionality and sophistication of the entire product. In addition, platform technology is
one of the key areas in which most automobile manufacturers compete as they introduce newer
designs and a higher level of performance. Not surprisingly, more financial and engineering
resources are required to develop a new platform design than most other components.
The extent of change required in a new project determines whether its core design (e.g.,
platform design) is newly developed or transferred and modified from other projects within the
firm. New product projects that develop their platforms from scratch without a preexisting base
design are categorized as the first type of the four, new design strategy. This distinction between
new design and the other three types is conceptually similar to the traditional categorization of
radical versus incremental innovation (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Ettlie, et al., 1984; Kleinschmidt
and Cooper, 1991). In this framework, incremental changes are broken down into three types,
depending on the location of the base design source and transfer timing: either an ongoing other
project, an existing other product, or the new project's direct predecessor product. These three
types are labeled here as rapid design transfer, sequential design transfer, and design
modification, respectively. Thus, the typology has four multi-project strategy types, including the
new design strategy and three variations of the design transfer strategy.
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Figure 1 Typology of the Project Strategy
Type 1: New Design
Type 2: Rapid Design Transfer
Type 3: Sequential Design Transfer
Type 4: Design Modification
New Product
Intod/ction
New Prlject
New Prqjet
Ongoing Other Projectl
New Priject
P I 
Past Project (Other Product Line)
New Prject
I
Predecessor
In the first type, new design, there is relatively low technological 
relatedness to or
interaction with other projects within the firm. Members of the new design project concentrate 
on
creating a new technology and design. While the project's engineering task requirements 
may be
the highest among the four because the core design is new and few 
components are shared with other
projects including its direct predecessor, both coordination costs with other projects 
and design
constraints may be low. This type of project is appropriate to incorporate the latest technology 
and
design into the new product without many restrictions.
The next two types of projects transfer and share a core design from other projects 
within
the firm. In the second type, rapid design transfer, a new project begins to transfer a 
core design
from a base project before the base project has completed its design engineering. 
In these two
projects, the new project and the base project, mutual adjustments are possible and perhaps 
likely,
because the development efforts overlap chronologically.
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The third type, sequential design transfer, transfers a design from a base model to a new
model after the base model's development is finished. This type of project basically reuses an
existing design that is "off-the-shelf." It may not be efficient or effective, compared to rapid
design transfer, because concurrent design task sharing and mutual adjustments are not possible1 .
In addition, when a new project uses the core design in this manner the design being transferred is
already relatively old compared to designs transferred as a base model is being developed, as in
rapid design transfer. Design constraints may also be high because this strategy may force the new
project to accommodate elements of the base core design from another product line.
The last type, design modification, refers to a new product project that develops a core
design directly based on that of a predecessor product. This type of project may also have to
consider constraints from the core design of the predecessor product (i.e., the current model). The
difference between the design modification and the sequential design transfer is only the source of
the base design and its application. In this definition, the extent of modification from the base
design does not have to be less than that of rapid design transfer or sequential design transfer.
Design modifications may be technically easier than a sequential design transfer, which transfers a
core design between different product lines. Another difference by definition is that sequential
design transfer can be used to add a new product line, while a design modification is only for
replacement projects.
3 Hypotheses on Lead Time and Productivity
In this section, we discuss the potential impact of different multi-project strategy types on
new product development lead time and engineering hours. We will again focus on the impact of
platform design usage on new product development projects. When we began this study, first, we
hypothesized that new car development using platform designs completely new to the firm should
require the longest lead time and the largest number of engineering hours (Clark and Fujimoto
1991). Developing a new platform requires time and engineering resources in all areas inicluding
drawing, prototype testing, and process engineering. In addition, because the platform design is a
core sub-system of the automobile, a new platform often requires new or extensively modified
components among the other primary vehicle components including body structure and drive train,
as well as new linking technologies between these components (Rosenberg, 1982; Henderson and
Clark, 1991; Iansiti, 1993).
1 This discussion of hypothetical differences between rapid and sequential design transfer is
partially based on Thompson's distinction between "long-linked technology" and "intensive
technology," where the latter also requires mutual adjustments and higher coordination costs. See
Thompson, 1967.
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Second, we hypothesized that among the other three multi-project strategies of rapid design
transfer, sequential design transfer and design modification, rapid design transfer may require the
least engineering hours, because this strategy should facilitate effective task sharing and mutual
adjustments among engineers, as shown in Figure 2. Conceptually related to this discussion,
numerous studies have provided evidence that mutual adjustments lead to greater efficiency and
effectiveness in transferring technology from upstream functions to downstream functions (e.g.,
Cohen, et al. 1979, Quinn and Mueller 1982; Imai, et al., 1985; Leonard-Barton, 1988; Gomory
1989; Leonald-Barton and Sinha 1991; Tyre, 1991; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). These studies have
also argued that mutual adjustments are most effectively and efficiently implemented when there
are overlapping and intensive communications among multiple functions. The same concept may be
applied to the case of the interface among multiple projects. Even when a new car project uses a
preceding or an existing platform design as a base, it develops new proprietary components for
other parts of the new car's design, such as the exterior body. Linking technologies between the
platform design and other components are complicated. It is predictable that many potential
problems are only identified after the new car project starts. Without any overlaps among the base
project and the new project, it is impossible to adjust the base platform design, so that the new
project can avoid these problems.
Figure 2 A Framework for Different Modes of Design Transfer
Sequential Design Transfer or
Design Modification Project
Raid Design Transfer Project
Base Project h
Transferring and reusing an old design in a new project may not be efficient, particularly
when engineers apply the old design in developing tihe new project in ways that cannot properly
target new market competition and new customer needs. For example, Cusumano (1991) has argued
that reusing existing designs in new software development without appropriate planning may have a
8
------sp o9, -..----- ___
negative impact on development productivity and quality. When there is a long time lag between a
base project and a new project that transfers a design from the base project, it is less likely that
there are specific plans for this design transfer during the base project.
4 Sample Characteristics and Measurements
In order to explore these questions, we surveyed 103 project managers of new car and truck
development projects: 78 at seven Japanese firms and 25 at three U.S. firms, This questionnaire
survey was conducted in the spring of 1992, and most of the projects were completed between 1986
and 1992. Questionnaires were distributed by one central contact at each company to project
managers. The actual number of questionnaires distributed and the selection of projects were
decided primarily by those contact persons. The only guideline for consistency was to distribute
the questionnaires to at most 15 project managers in each firm who had recently worked on
relatively large new product projects. The sample did end up including some variations in project
contents that will be discussed later. In the questionnaire, product variations such as different
body types and trim levels which are developed within a distinct project are defined as a single
product. Questionnaires were pre-tested with three project managers. In particular, we discussed
with several project managers and engineers the definitions and measurements of lead time and
engineering hours which are described in Appendix 1. Throughout our research project, including
our data analysis stage,' we conducted in-depth interviews with approximately 130 engineers and 30
new product project managers at five Japanese, three U.S., and four European firms between
September 1991 and May 19932.
Project Strategy Type
One survey question asked whether the platform design each project developed was new to
the firm or based on a preceding design. New projects that developed their platform design without
any base design were categorized as following the "new design" strategy. New projects based on a
platform design of their direct predecessors, which were to be replaced by these new projects, were
categorized as "design modifications". Those projects based on the platform design of other product
lines were categorized as either "rapid design transfer" or "sequential design transfer". The
determination of which category depended on the answer to a question that asked if there were
overlaps and interactions between the new project and the base project with respect to platform
design development. Additionally, a project meets the definition of a transfer only if the managers
of the base project and the new project are different.
2 Our field study included three trips to Japan, one to Europe, and several to Detroit, augmented
by numerous interviews around Boston with MIT's International Motor Vehicle Program
participants.
9
*r(lis _____
The average time lag between the new project and the base project with respect to market
introduction was, as shown in Figure 3, 15.0 months for rapid design transfer and 66.6 months for
sequential design transfer. The difference in lags made us believe that this question served to
distinguish adequately between these two (see Appendix 2 for complete distributions of the time
lag associated with each strategy). At 81.2 months, the average time lag for projects using the
design of one of their direct predecessors, the design modification strategy, is even longer than that
of sequential design transfer projects.
Figure 3 Multi-project strategy and Average Design Transfer Time Lag
New AesLeadime-.0 months i 
Average Tme Lag- 5.0 months
Base Project
Lead Time-0.2 months
c _T _ mhrame La_6 months_ _ _ 
Desin odification Bas Project . .
Project Content and Control Variables
It is always critically important to control for differences in project complexity in order to
accurately compare lead time and productivity across different projects. First, design complexity
and newness are measured by the ratio of new components versus carried over components in two
separate areas, body/interior and engine/transmission. The automobile design consists of three
primary component groups: body/interior, engine/transmission, and platform. Therefore, these new
10
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component ratio variables cover the rest of the automobile design not contained within the platform.
Second, many components in new product projects are completely new yet do not impart any new
technical features, and should be distinguished from components that incorporate technology new to
the firm. Therefore, in addition to the new component ratio, we also measured the innovativeness of
each project by asking whether the technology used in each component area brought new technical
features to the firm (yes =1, no =0). The average of the answers in these two areas was calculated to
create an innovativeness index, which ranges from 0 to 1. Third, price in the market and the
number of body types for each new product were also measured, because these may also
significantly affect project complexity. 3 Finally, a vehicle type variable denotes whether a project
is for a car or a truck, because the other design complexity variables used did not capture the
different design and market characteristics for these two kinds of vehicles. We felt that such
differences might potentially have an impact on project performance.
5 Survey Results
Lead Time and Engineering Hours
Table 1 summarizes the raw data on project content, lead time and engineering hours for
each different multi-project strategy type. The set of projects studied are, in general, relatively
major projects as opposed to minor facelift projects, as indicated by the average percentage of new
design ratio for body and interior components (89%).
With respect to multi-project strategy applied to platform design, 27 of 103 projects (26%
of all projects) were developed as completely new platform designs within their projects, while the
other projects used existing designs or transfers from on-going projects. Among the remaining 76
projects, 23 projects or 22% of all projects followed the rapid design transfer strategy, in which a
platform design was transferred from other projects in progress to the new projects.- Twenty of the
23 rapid design transfer strategy projects were Japanese, which is a much higher proportion of
projects than that of the other multi-project strategy types. Twenty of 103 projects or 19% of all
projects followed the sequential design transfer strategy and 33 projects or 32% were design
modification projects. The average project time lag for each multi-project strategy is presented in
Figure 3.
3 Clark and Fujimoto (1991) also used all of these control variables in their study. Our study
intentionally uses their set of variables for product characteristics.
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Table 1 Data on Project Content and Project Performance4
l atform Desig New Design Rapid Sequential Design Total
Design Transfer Design Transfer Modification
# of Projects 27 23 20 33 103
Japanese 19 20 13 26 78
US 8 3 7 7 25
Price ($) 21200 (8860) 15540 (7610) 16380 (7720) 15290 (7220) 17090 (8100)
# of Body Types o 1.7 (0.6) 1.6 (0.5) 1.7 (0.8) 2.1 (0.9) 1.8 (0.7)
Truck/Van 7 5 3 8 23
New Design Ratio (%)
Engine / Transmission 72 (32) 57 (40) 61 (35) 58 (36) 61 (36)
Body / Interior 92 (20) 91 (20) 95 (12) 82 (31) 89 (23)
Innovativeness Index (0-1) 0.35 (0.33) 0.30 (0.36) 0.23 (0.30) 0.07 (0.18) 0.23 (0.31)
Lead Time (months)" 60.0 (15.6) 50.1 (11.9) 50.1 (12.4) 49.4 (14.9) 52.5 (14.5)
Engineering Hours'
(million hours) 1.89 (1.60) 0.72 (0.48) 2.02 (2.55) 1.95 (2.03) 1.66 (1.87)
Difference statistically significant at: *** 1% Level, ** 5% Level, * 10% Level (One-way ANOVA)
Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
There are some differences in project content among the different multi-project strategies
which have to be controlled for to accurately compare the impact of the strategy type on project
performance. For example, new platform designs tend to be developed more often for more
expensive products than for less expensive products, as the average price for each strategy type
indicates. At $21,200 the average price for a new-design-strategy project is much higher than that
of other types. Less expensive products may be more cost-constrained and may use more existing
components. A new design strategy in the platform tends to be associated with more new
components in the engine and transmission designs. Because of the system nature of automobile
design, a new platform design, which is a core sub-system, may necessitate more new component
designs in the rest of the vehicle's design. In addition, projects utilizing a new design strategy for
the platform tend to focus on technical innovation and design quality as opposed to product costs,
as shown later in this section. This difference in objectives for new product development projects
may be another reason why new-design-strategy projects develop more new engine and transmission
components.
New projects categorized under the design modification strategy, on average, developed more
body variations and offered less technical innovation than the other types of projects. It is easily
4 We were able to collect engineering hour data for only 76 projects among the total sample of 103
projects. The data summary for the 76 projects shown in Appendix 3 is not significantly different
from the data in the total sample.
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observed that established "bread-and-butter" product lines such as the Sentra or the Corolla tend
to have a large number of body variations and also frequently use the design modification strategy.
On the other hand, the number of body types for rapid design transfer projects tends to be small.
This may be because a project following the rapid design transfer strategy tends to be a derivative
product.
Table 2 lists the regression results for lead time and engineering hours. Engineering hours
are converted using a natural logarithm 5 . Model 1 for lead time and engineering hours uses only
basic control variables, including nationality, price, and vehicle type. Model 2 and Model 3 contain
all important variables, including those for project. complexity and multi-project strategy types.
Model 1 for lead time shows that more expensive products and trucks tend to require more time.
Japanese projects tend to be shorter than the U.S. projects. Model 2, which introduces the multi-
project strategy variables, shows that the new design strategy requires by far the longest lead time,
and the other three strategies similarly shorten the lead time. Nationality and price factors
disappear when the multi-project strategy variables are included.
5 We obtained a residual plot for predicted values from a trial regression analysis using
unadjusted engineering hours as a dependent variable and independent variables in Model 2 of
Table 2. The plot indicated that the engineering hours should be adjusted by logarithm.
Specifically, many residuals showed minuses in the middle of the predicted values and large
positive numbers for the high predicted values. The standard deviation for engineering hours,
which is even bigger than the average, is also a crude indicator of the need for adjustments.
13
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Table 2 Regression Analyses for Lead Time and Engineering Hours
Independent Variables
Constant
Nation (US-1, Japan=O)
Product's Price ($ in ten thousands)
Vehicle Type (Car=O, Truck=1)
Project Task Complexity
Number of Body Types
New Design Ratio % (Engine /I Transmissio
New Design Ratio % (Body Interior)
Innovativeness Index (0 - 1)
Inter-project Strategy Type of Platform Desigr
1. New Design
2. Rapid Design Transfer
3. Sequential Design Transfer
4. Design Modification
Adjusted Squared Multiple R
Sample Size
Lead Time
(months)
Model 1 Model 2
43.38 37.74
5.60 * 3.67
3.20 * 1.81
10.26 10.01 **
3.76 
) -1.40
6.30
10.10 **
-6.99 *
-7.22 *
-7.36 **
0.16 0.25
103 103
Engineering Hours
In (million hours)
(Supplier
Adjusted)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
13.30 11.27 11.56
1.35' 1.13 1.16 **
0.01 0.00 0.02
0.13 0.25 0.20
0.57 *^ 0.59 -
0.10 0.00
1.20 ** 1.30 **
0.65 * 0.68*
-0.55 ^* -0.60 *
-0.18 -0.18
-0.06 -0.08
0.32 0.58 0.57
76 76 76
Statistically Significant at: * 10% Level, ** 5% Level, *** 1% Level
With respect to engineering hours, in Model 1 with only control variables, Japanese projects
require far fewer hours, but product price or vehicle type does not have an influence. In Model 2,
engineering hours for the new design strategy are again larger than the other three multi-project
strategies. However, in marked contrast with the results regarding lead time, among new product
projects following the three multi-project strategies, only new projects using the rapid design
transfer strategy require significantly fewer engineering hours than those using the new design
strategy 6.
In order to visually compare lead time and engineering hours among the four multi-project
strategies, Figure 4 illustrates adjusted results from the regression analyses in Table 2. This
adjustment scheme used the average numbers for all independent variables in Appendix 3 (product
price=S17,300, # of body types=1.8, engine/transmission new component ratio=62%, body/interior
new component ratio=90%, innovativeness index = 0.23) except for the country and vehicle-type
dummy variables (=U.S. passenger car projects).
6 This result does not change when engineering hours are adjusted for supplier contribution in
design to include engineering hours for both internal and external tasks (See Appendix 1 for the
adjustment method).
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Figure 4 Comparisons in Adjusted Lead Time and Engineering Hours
Lead Time Engineering
(Months) Hours
_H usl; X
60
40
20
A
3
2
0
IV Rapid Sequential
New Design Design Design Modification
Transfer Transfer Modification
Although the adjusted scheme shown above is statistically appropriate, it may not be totally
realistic in depicting actual product development projects. For example, the adjusted engineering
hours for design-modification projects are close to those for new-design projects. However, as
shown in Table 1, a new design strategy for the platform tends to be associated with more new
designs and technologies in the engine/transmission and the body/interior components. On the
other hand, new product development following the design modification strategy does not usually
introduce many new technologies or designs. Therefore, we also calculated adjusted numbers that
use the average values of the new component ratios and the innovativeness index for each strategy,
while still using the average of the total sample for other independent variables (see Nobeoka, 1993
for actual data). In this adjustment scheme, new-design projects require far more engineering
hours than the other strategies.
Because the engineering hour data were collected for only the rapid design transfer projects,
and not the combination of a given rapid design transfer project and its preceding base project,
there may be questions regarding negative impacts to the base project. If these impacts are severe
enough, the usefulness of the rapid design transfer strategy might become suspect. In order to test
this criticism, a question in the survey asked whether there was another concurrent project with
which the respondent's project shared the platform design, and had significant overlap and
interaction. The results showed that these concurrent projects (i.e., other rapid design transfer
15
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projects) did not significantly add engineering hours to the respondent's projects (see Nobeoka,
1993 for the actual analysis). This leads us to believe that a rapid design transfer project would
not significantly impede a preceding base project.
Other Important Findings on Lead Time and Engineering Hours
Other significant findings exhibited in the regression analyses in Table 2 include the
influences of the project task complexity variables upon lead time and engineering hours. First,
the number of body types and the new design ratio of body/interior components only have a strong
influence on the required number of engineering hours, not on lead time, while the innovativeness
index greatly affects both lead time and engineering hours. Design for additional body types or
additional new components may be developed in parallel and may require little extra time.
Therefore, these additional tasks necessitate more engineering hours, but not additional lead time
as long as variations are designed in parallel. Developing technologies new to the firm requires
extra time for idea generation, producing prototypes, and testing, which cannot be done completely
in parallel. New technologies tend to require new manufacturing equipment, which cannot be done
completely in parallel either. Therefore, developing more new components that incorporate
technological features new to the firm requires both a longer lead time and more engineering hours.
Secondly, trucks are associated with a longer lead time than cars, although there is no
significant difference in engineering hours. For example, product life cycles for cars at Japanese
firms are, on average, about four or five years, while those of trucks are generally eight years or
more. This difference primarily reflects variations in the competition and the nature of each
market. A program manager for a truck program at a Japanese firm in our interview explained that
it is not necessary to shorten the lead time of trucks as much as that of cars, and this is one of the
reasons why the lead time for truck projects tends to be longer than those for cars. In other words,
this data may supports the idea that lead time is affected not only by organizational capabilities
but also by the nature of the market.
One other important finding in Table 2 is in contrast with a finding in Clark and Fujimoto
(1991). Our data suggest that, after controlling for all variables for project characteristics, the
U.S. firms are not significantly behind Japanese firms with respect to lead time, although there are
still great differences in engineering hours. We attribute the difference between the two studies to
improvements at U.S. firms and the difference in the timing of projects. The data in the Clark and
Fujimoto study comes from projects in the mid-1980s, while the project data presented here was
generated between the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Our interviews with the U.S. engineers suggested that they generally had been targeting a
shorter lead time through a cross-functional team approach, which has resulted in a greater
separation between projects than is evident in Japanese firms. A question in our survey revealed
16
____1__1  I __1 
__111
that, on average, 66% of engineers in the U.S. projects fully dedicated their time to a single project,
while only 41% of Japanese engineers did (the difference was statistically significant at the 0.001
level). A project team approach may not be efficient with respect to engineering hours.
Engineering task sharing between multiple projects is difficult to implement, though it may be good
for shortening the lead time of individual projects. In our field studies, we found that at two of the
three U.S. firms, managers have internally argued about the advantages and disadvantages of the
project-team approach and co-location of engineers.
6 Discussions on "Rapid Design Transfer"
This section discusses some implications of the survey results on the rapid design transfer
strategy. First, we suggest potential reasons for the productivity advantages of this strategy, based
on our extensive interviews with project managers and engineers. Then we discuss organizational
requirements to manage rapid design transfer projects, which include particular communication
patterns for project managers and a strong control above project managers, respectively.
6-1 Efficient Multi-Project Management: Rapid Design Transfer
There are at least several reasons why fewer engineering hours are required to develop a
project using a rapid design transfer strategy than other multi-project strategies, including the
other design transfer strategies 7 . In a rapid design transfer, engineers can transfer a design from a
preceding base project. to a new project more efficiently than in sequential design transfer or design
modification projects. There are two basic factors that may contribute to this difference. First, the
time lag between completion of a base project and that of a new project is much shorter in a rapid
design transfer project than the other two types of transfer strategies. Second, there is overlap
between a preceding base project and the new project only in the rapid design transfer strategy.
These two factors create specific advantages and disadvantages in productivity for each multi-
project strategy. The first factor, the time lag between completion of a base project and that of a
new project, may affect the difficulty of advanced planning and of incorporating old designs into a
new design architecture. The second factor, overlap between a preceding base project and a new
project, may have an influence on the feasibility and the efficiency of inter-project communication.
These issues are categorized into the following five areas: (1) advanced planning, (2) mutual
adjustments, task sharing, and joint design, (3) transfer of a fresh' design vs. dated" design, (4)
problems of anonymous" design, and (5) role of a general manager for multi-project management.
7 Program managers and engineers we interviewed basically agreed with our interpretations.
However, some of the following interpretations are still only hypotheses that should be studied
further in detail.
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(1) Advanced Planning
When a new project transfers and uses a platform from a preceeding project, the new
project usually needs to modify the base platform design to adjust it to the new project's
proprietary architecture. The difference in design requirements for the platform design between
the two projects may be caused by many factors, such as different customer needs. In addition,
linking technologies between the platform and other components of the automobile design such as
the exterior body are often different between the base product and the new product. Because body
designs are usually different between the two products, this difference alone often requires
adjustments to the base platform design.
It may be more efficient if advanced plans are made during the base project regarding how
a future project might use the base project's platform design. The time lag between a base project
and rapid design transfer project is much shorter than that between a base project and other
transfer strategies, as. shown in Figure 3. The time lag between the base project and the new project
is long in sequential design transfer and in design modification, at 66.6 months and 81.2 months,
respectively. These long time lags may reflect circumstances in which the base platform was
designed without any plans or considerations for a potential transfer to other future projects. A
question in this survey asked the program managers about the timing of decisions to make use of the
base platform designs in the new projects. In only 33% of the projects following sequential design
transfer and design modification strategies had a decision about the usage of the particular base
platform design been made before the base project was completed.
More importantly, even when there is an advanced plan during the base project which
describes how a future project will modify and use the base project's platform design, there are
often unexpected adjustments required during the new project. It is almost impossible to make
accurate plans to modify the course of the base platform design to transfer it to the new project
when there is such a long time lag between these two projects. It is difficult for engineers in the
base project to predict problems a future project may have in using the old platform design. In
particular, many potential problems with respect to the linking technologies become evident only
after the new project starts, because these problems may become more obvious only after the design
of other components begins. With respect to linking technologies, adjustments or changes in many
cases cannot be completed within the platform engineering function.
(2) Mutual Adjustments, Task Sharing, and Joint Design
Whether or not there are such advanced plans, and partly because of interdependencies
between component sub-systems, adjustment processes are so complicated that they can be more
efficiently done through multiple iterations of feedback between the two projects. Because only
rapid design transfer projects have significant overlap with a base project, only in rapid design
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transfer projects can the engineers designing components implement mutual adjustments with base
projects8 .
Figure 5 Conceptual Models for Mutual Adjustments, Task Sharing, and Joint
Design
Mutual Adiustments Mutual Adjustments
Mutual Aiusmrnels and Task Shag and Joint Desig
r ..... .: .... i-.... .
Project
New Product [
D:^_ I a/
""" Ivf! l" ! I [ . I
" ~-- "' Mutual Adjustments(III:.:) .Engineers in Base Product
::: ? .... Project
If7 ~ Engineers in New Product
Project
In addition to the mutual adjustments, because of the overlapping and interactions, these
two projects also can appropriately share engineering tasks and resources (task sharing). For
example, in our interviews, some engineers explained that the same testing prototype can only be
shared by multiple interrelated projects for data collection, when engineers in both projects
cooperate closely. Moreover, in other cases, engineers from the two projects can jointly work on
certain engineering tasks as a group (joint design). Mutual adjustments, task sharing and joint
design with a base project, all of which can be appropriately implemented only in a rapid design
transfer project, may have contributed to the reduction in engineering hours required. Conceptual
models are shown in Figure 5.
(3) Transfer of "Fresh Designs vs. Dated" Designs
There are also fundamental problems with use of a dated" platform design as a base in a
new project following sequential design transfer or design modification. In our data, even in the
projects using an existing or preceding design as a base, other components in the projects,
including body and interior components, are mostly newly developed. This mixture may create
some difficulties in linking the old platform design with new designs in other parts of the
8 By definition of our categorization scheme for the multi-project strategy types, explained
earlier, only in rapid design transfer projects did engineers have overlap and actual interactions
with engineers on other projects from which platform designs were transferred.
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automobile. For example, over the past decade, the usage of CAD in design has become more
extensive each year. The old designs might have been drawn on paper, instead of using a CAD tool,
which has become common only in the last several years. One other example is the increasing use of
plastic or aluminum materials for the body panels, which may not appropriately fit with older
platform designs. Some engineers in our interviews also commented that design requirements
evolving from customer needs, market competition, or governmental regulations often change after
the original design is completed, especially when the time lag between the completion of the base
design and its transfer to the new project is long. These difficulties may also increase the
engineering hours of the sequential design transfer projects, because the modifications may become
complicated.
(4) Problems of "Anonymous" Design
In sequential design transfer or design modification projects, design must often have been
transferred from base projects through design drawings and specifications, because the base
projects were already completed and the engineers for the base projects may have already started
working on other projects. Some of these engineers may even have already left the firm. Therefore,
it can be difficult for engineers on the new project to find and communicate with engineers who
worked on the old base platform design. It may not be convenient for engineers who designed the
base platform design to help the engineers on the new project understand the base design.
Moreover, engineers for the completed base project may not have enough motivation to cooperate
with the engineers for the new project, particularly when they have already started working on
other projects that have nothing to do with the new project.
These issues are important because face-to-face design transfer is much more efficient than
design transfer through specifications and drawings, particularly regarding some types of
knowledge transfers. As our data suggest, an old base platform design always needs modification
when it is used in other products. Some engineers in our interviews mentioned that, in order to
modify a base design, they often need more knowledge than that which could be found in standard
drawings or in CAD data. For example, the relationship between modifications in design and
consequent changes in functionality is not shown in the drawings. Only engineers who actually
worked on the base design may have that kind of information in their minds or notes. Second,
knowledge about the base design that engineers in the new project may need to modify and adjust
the base design to fit the new project may include intangible or tacit understanding. It is difficult
for them to transfer that kind of design knowledge without actual overlap and interaction with
engineers familiar with the base platform design (Nonaka, 1990; von Hippel, 1990).
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(5) Role of a General Manager for Multi-Project Management
Finally, there is another organizational factor that may differentiate the productivity of
rapid design transfer from other multi-project strategies. There are usually general managers or
vice presidents above the project managers responsible for product development. These higher-
level general managers are sometimes called platform managers, and have responsibility for
multiple new product projects. They are likely to be responsible for both a base project and a rapid
design transfer project, because the time lag between these projects is short.. Because of the long
time lag, it is less likely that the same general manager is responsible for both a base project and a
sequential design transfer project, or for both a base project and a design modification project.
This difference in leadership may affect the efficiency of design transfer between the two projects.
For example, a general manager is likely to consider the total productivity of the base project and
the rapid design transfer project together, while such concern is less likely if he or she expects to
move on before a related follow-on project. In other words, the shorter the time lag between
multiple interrelated projects, the greater the potential benefit of a single strong general manager,
who would lead and manage multiple projects. 9
As discussed in Section 3, some of the perspectives in the discussions above about the
efficiency of rapid design transfer are analogous to the efficiency of managing overlaps among
different functions. Multiple functions, at least to some extent, have a sequential nature in terms
of tasking. Managing overlaps among multiple functions such as described by the term
"simultaneous engineering" could lead to some negative implications due to the necessarily
sequential nature of some tasks. On the other hand, by managing overlap among multiple projects,
via "rapid design transfer", a firm may avoid these types of negative influences, as long as these
projects coordinate with each other and mutually adjust their designs. We believe that this lack of
negative implications also at least partially explains why our results demonstrated a strong gain in
project productivity through rapid design transfer.
6-2 Communication between Project Managers
In order to implement the rapid design transfer strategy, there should be appropriate
communication patterns among project managers for related projects. With respect to inter-project
coordination between concurrent projects, engineers or functional managers in each design
functioning in isolation, such as in a platform design department, may not be able to coordinate
among multiple projects, even only with respect to the transfer of the platform design. An
9 A similar argument could be made not only for general managers, but also for other key
functional engineering personnel who are responsible for component engineering on multiple
projects.
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automobile design is a system in which most major components are interdependent. Transfer of a
certain component cannot be completed without considering its particular interdependencies with
other components of each specific product project1 0. As Clark and Fujimoto (1991) discussed,
cross-functional interactions caused by an interdependency are managed effectively only by project
managers. Therefore, coordination between multiple project managers may be particularly
important in the transfer of a platform design across multiple projects, in addition to coordination
through functional managers who are responsible for specific components over multiple projects
and coordination between engineers for different projects. In other words, even the component-
level interactions between multiple projects may require project-level or system-level coordination
when the components are parts of sub-systems and interdependent with other components within
the project.
Therefore, in rapid design transfer projects, project managers may have had to communicate
extensively with project managers in base projects. In order to examine this question, we asked the
103 project managers, in the same questionnaire survey, about the frequency of meetings on their
project with project managers from other projects as well as with functional managers. Although we
understood that the frequency of meetings may have varied during the course of the project, the
questionnaire asked the project managers to estimate an average over the project's duration. The
meetings are defined in the questionnaire to include both formal and informal ones. The results are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Communication of Program Managers with Functional Managers and
Program Managers for Other Projects
Frequency of Meetings Functional Managers
(times/month) Project Managers for other
Proiects
of project managers who had meetings more
requently with other project managers than with
unctional managers**
Rapid Design
Transfer Projects
2.2
4.3
48%
Projects in Other
Multi-Project
Strategies
3.2
2.9
24%
** Difference significant at the 5% level
Project managers for rapid design transfer projects had meetings with other project
managers more frequently (4.3 times a month) than managers for projects under other strategies
(2.9 times). Project mangers for rapid design transfer projects also met with functional managers
10 The perspective in which the majority of vehicle components form a sub-systems of a whole
automobile design will be further discussed in the next section.
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less frequently than project managers for other projects. As a result, almost half of the project
managers (48%) for rapid design transfer projects had meetings with project managers of other
projects more frequently than with functional managers. This number is significantly larger than
the equivalent number for project managers of other multi-project strategy projects (24%). The
data thus suggest that project managers for rapid design transfer projects seem to have needed to
spend more' time on inter-project coordination through meetings with project managers on the other
project. In addition, the project manager's focus in their project management activities seems to
shift at least some extent from cross-functional integration alone to both cross-functional
integration and inter-project coordination at the project level.
6-3 Organizational Structure: Multi-Project Management
In order to manage concurrent multiple projects, a rapid design transfer project and its base
project, there should be an appropriate organizational structure. In our interviews, we found that
some manufacturers have been shifting their orientation from the management of a single project to
multi-project management. Toyota's organizational evolution pattern shows an example of this
trend. As Clark and Fujimoto (1991, pp. 276-280) discussed, by the late 1970s most Japanese
companies had shifted from functionally-oriented organizations to project manager-based
structures. By the mid 1980s, a few Japanese firms including Toyota had already shifted to
relatively heavyweight project manager systems, or the Shusa" system, which has been widely
discussed (Ikari, 1985; Shiosawa, 1987). However, in 1993, Toyota created several chief engineers
above shusas. Each of the chief engineers, by managing several shusas, is responsible for multiple
concurrent projects. The person in this position assumes some of the authority that a powerful
leader for a single project, a shusa, used to have. One of the primary purposes of creating a position
more powerful than the shusa is facilitating the transfer and sharing of new designs among multiple
projects. In doing so, Toyota's organization may have already shifted to a multi-project orientation.
In the past few years some other manufacturers in Japan, the U.S., and Europe have also
introduced this type of organizational structure, so that multiple projects could also be managed by
a strong control mechanism above project managers. One common mechanism for control is to divide
the whole project portfolio into several groups and to place general managers above the individual
project managers for individual projects. Although different manufacturers form their groupings
differently, we were able to identify three categories from actual examples at nine manufacturers:
1. Design-oriented group (e.g., small vs. medium vs. large cars, front-wheel vs. rear-wheel
drives.): Toyota, Ford, Chrysler, Fiat, Renault.
2. Plant-oriented group (e.g., products manufactured at plant A vs. plant B vs. plant C.): Honda.
3. Customer-oriented group (e.g., luxury vs. economical vs. sporty/leisure market segments.):
Nissan, Mazda, Mitsubishi.
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These differences may reflect each firm's priority for its multi-project strategy: either
focusing on the efficiency of design, manufacturing or customer segment. The organizational
processes in managing multiple projects may also be different. In order to explore these
organizational issues, further studies including intensive interviews and internal document
analyses are needed.
7 Conclusions
One of the key concepts that we proposed in this study with respect to multi-project
management is rapid design transfer among multiple projects using overlapping coordination. This
strategy provides firms with advantages in project productivity. Based on our interviews with
engineers and project managers at U.S., Japanese, and European manufacturers, we also suggested
several potential reasons for the efficiency of the rapid design transfer strategy. Only through
rapid design transfer and multi-project coordination can a design be transferred from a base
project to a new project with effective task sharing among engineers and mutual adjustments
between the two projects. In addition, it may often be difficult to transfer a design from a
relatively old project, as is the case with sequential design transfer. It is difficult to adjust an old
design to a new architecture and the new requirements of the new product. Organizations at both
the management level and the engineering level cannot strongly support a multi-project perspective
when two or more projects are far apart from each other chronologically. In addition, we argued that
in order to manage rapid design transfer, project managers for the new projects need to coordinate
with project managers on the base projects from which the design is transferred. In our survey,
project managers for rapid design transfer projects tended to have more meetings with project
managers in other projects than project managers of projects following other strategies.
This paper also argued that organizational structures and processes that are appropriate for
managing rapid design transfer may not be a traditional functional approach, because of the system
characteristics of the products. Rather, they should be aimed at achieving both cross-functional
coordination and intra-functional coordination simultaneously through the active coordination of
multiple projects. This search for balance requires a multi-project management perspective, rather
than a single-project management perspective. This approach would maximize the distinctiveness
of product components essential to, differentiate one product from another, but also reduces
development time and costs as well as manufacturing expense by sharing as many components as
possible. Companies may need either strong control above the matrix organization, or
organizational structures and processes that enable system-level coordination across multiple
projects. Because this study has primarily focused on strategic issues, further studies need to
examine these organizational issues both theoretically and empirically.
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Definitions and Measurements of Lead Time and Engineering Hours
Lead Time
The questionnaire asked program managers to estimate the lead time from the beginning of
concept and product planning to job #1. This period includes primary development tasks including
"concept and product planning", "product engineering and testing", "process engineering", and
"pilot production".
La d me
Concept and Product Plannin I
Product Engineering and TestgI
Pduct Er iring a Test.ng
I Process Engineering
Pilot Productio and Job #1
I - 1
I I
Engineering
Hours .
AssumDtion for Chanae in Enaineerino Hours
ii
:5::::
ss:S ,,
I:zz;z,.d:t;.·t;·z is·2-5 :·55:::::::1·:·····f·
::::::::: ':`:: ou
::::·:s-t::"'"'5· I!

:;; ':::::! .5llf21·i
i ·sss; 2·5·i·
rt
rt. f:::s·s:·:sf·zzs·:.·;·
" 7'.:::::::·:s::55:! ;ss-
 Xg' ,;:i·zi.ssi·.s:5; t.
 :::::::::::s::::·rt::::.T.,. 5-.·.· 
-:"':·: :::::::: :Ss·;·.
:::i::::::;::::::::s:::::::::::::::::,,,,
··:·:··::::·:·:··?
, ·s·5'::::::::::::::::::::::::: i
:::::::::::frs:::-r';%5'::''::::::::::::::11:.Z.
:f::::;::::;:::;:::;:::: :·::i, -:·: · ·::: :::;··i·  s··:f
 ,t 5·55  ::::::::::::::::z;·' ·  "3: :E':zt;i'::':':':"i:::::::::::"
·-r.-.,,.. 555:I::::::f:: Z·:-5.R:s·  _ f  i -:..+5· ·-Z"Z' '.i·55s··5f
::::::::.'::i:is··;·2.·Z.z , t·.f:Sls .;.:::::::·:f;r·;·.·r;·.·t:.·, '·"  8: :
Descriptions of Each Stage of New Product Development
* Concept Planning and Product Planning
Product concepts such as target customers, selling points and major technical features are
determined. In addition, through the synthesis of product engineering, product concepts, specific
market needs, and cost constraints, the product's specification is determined. Performance targets
are also determined.
· Product Engineering and Testing
Based on the product concepts, the performance target, and the major specifications, engineers
design detailed engineering drawings. After a few pre-drawing releases to gain feedback from
testing, the final drawings are released.
· Process Engineering
Based on the product information such as engineering drawings, the process design begins. The
process design is transferred to tooling, NC tapes, and workers' manuals.
* Pilot Production and Job #1
In order to test the manufacturing process as it was designed, a product is produced in an actual
production line. Then, actual production for sale, job 1, begins.
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Appendix 1
I
Appendix '1 (continued)
Engineering Hours
Engineering hours (EH) for each project are estimated as follows.
EH=(FS+PS*PR)*LT*WH/2
FS: The number of engineers who worked on the project (full time).
PS: The number of engineers who worked on the project (part time).
PR: Average percentage of time part time engineers spent on one project*.
LT: Lead Time (months)
WH: Average monthly working hours per engineer*.
This estimation scheme is based on our interviews and discussions with engineers primarily at five
Japanese firms. In this equation, the number is divided by two based on the assumption with
respect to a typical pattern of changes in engineering hours throughout each project, as shown in
the figure in the previous page.
Adjustments for Supplier Contribution
The data on average supplier contribution in component design for each manufacturer is obtained
from -the questionnaire survey of design engineers.
EHA= EH/(1-SC)
EHA: Adjusted engineering hours by supplier's contribution.
EH: Engineering hours explained'above.
SC: Average supplier's contribution at the corporate level*.
(* The corporate-level average, obtained from the questionnaire survey of design engineers, which
was conducted in the same research project. The method of this survey is described in Nobeoka,
1993)
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Appendix 2 Difference in Time Lag with Base Project
Transfer and Sequential Design Transfer
# of Projects
I
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
between Rapid Design
(N=103)
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Appendix 3 Data on Project Content and Project Performance (N=76)
Platform Design New Design Rapid Sequential Design Total
.__....... Design Transfer Design Transfer Modification
# of Projects 18 18 16 24 76
Japanese 11 15 9 17 52
US 7 3 7 7 24
Price ($) 21390 (8680) 16390 (7920) 15160(7040) 16350 (7590) 17300 (8000)
# of Body Types · 1.7 (0.6) 1.7 (0.5) 1.6 (0.8) 2.0 (0.9) 1.8 (0.7)
Truck/Van 4 4 2 4 14
New Design Ratio (%)
Engine / Transmission 69 (34) 63 (39) 64 (37) 54 (36) 62 (37)
Body / Interior 98 (7) 89 (22) 94 (13) 83 (31) 90 (22)
Innovativeness Index (0-1) 0.33 (0.30) 0.33 (0.38) 0.22 (0.32) 0.08 (0.19) 0.23 (0.31)
Lead Time (months) 57.9 (14.0) 49.7 (11.1) 49.0 (13.3) 50.1 (15.2) 51.6 (13.8)
Engineering Hours
(million hours) 1.89 (1.60) 0.72(0.48) 2.02 (2.55) 1.95 (2.031 1.66 (1.87)
Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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